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Abstract: Facing widespread poverty and land degradation, Vietnam started a land reform in 1993
as part of its renovation policy package known as “Doi Moi”. This paper examines the impacts of
improved land tenure security, via this land reform, on manure use by farm households. As manure
potentially improves soil fertility by adding organic matter and nutrients to the soil surface, it might
contribute to improving soil productive capacity and reversing land degradation. Random effect
regression models are applied to a panel dataset of 133 farm households in the Northern Uplands
of Vietnam collected in 1993, 1998, and 2006. The results confirm that land tenure security has
positive effects on manure use, but the levels of influence differ depending on whether the land has
been privatized or whether the land title has already been issued. In addition, manure use is also
influenced by the number of cattle and pigs, the education level and ethnicity of household heads,
farm land size and non-farm income. The findings suggest that speeding up land privatization and
titling, encouraging cattle and pig rearing, and improving education would promote manure use
in farm production. However, careful interpretation of our research findings is required as land
privatization, together with economic growth and population pressure, might lead to overuse of
farm inputs.
Keywords: land reform; economic incentive; random effect econometric models
1. Introduction
Land degradation is a threat to food security and sustainability of agricultural production [1–3]
and has been given high priority on the international development agenda as it is prevalent in the rural
areas of developing countries [4–6]. This threat has generated concerns, since producing sufficient
food to feed an increasing population remains one of the biggest global development challenges [7,8].
The world’s population is expected to reach 9.6 billion people in 2050 and nearly all of the population
growth is forecasted to take place in developing countries [9], where food production would need to
almost double to meet the food demand [10]. Additionally, agroecosystems provide not only food,
but also various other ecosystem services, such as water provision and sediment prevention [11],
which also need to be managed in a sustainable way [12]. Soil erosion losses contribute to the
decline of soil productivity [13], deterioration of water quality [14], and intensification of air pollution.
When productive land is degraded, the livelihoods of the rural population might be no longer secure,
resources become overexploited, social tensions increase, traditional cultural systems collapse, and
armed conflicts can break out [15,16]. Thus, conserving and improving soil fertility are becoming
increasingly important [17].
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In response to these concerns, considerable efforts have been made to promote soil
conservation [18,19]. Sustainable land use practices and soil management procedures have been
developed that are capable of reducing soil erosion and land degradation, as well as restoring and
increasing soil fertility. Examples include reduced tillage, contour farming, grass buffer strips, and
increased manure use in agricultural production. However, rates of adoption remain low in developing
countries [20]. One of the explanations put forth for low adoption rates is insecure land tenure
regimes [21,22]. The relationship between land tenure and economic development has deserved
special attention by scholars and policy makers as farmland is the main source of livelihoods for
the majority of farmers in developing countries [23,24]. Economic theory has long suggested that
increased tenure security, classically defined in terms of private ownership, will lead to increased soil
productivity [25,26], and provide an incentive for farmers in developing countries to improve soil
fertility [27,28]. An almost universal mechanism of land tenure security is a unified system of land
registration and documentation whereby the state provides the landowner with proof that a given
well-defined tract of land does indeed belong to the landowner. If the registration system is effective,
and if the state can protect the owner from encroachment or false challenges to his or her ownership,
such a mechanism does enhance security [29,30]. As soil conservation is considered an investment in
land [31,32], farmers in developing countries are more willing to invest in soil conservation if their
land tenure is secure so that they can receive the returns of their investment.
Although the basic economic logic between land tenure security and soil-related investments,
including soil conservation, is clear [33,34], the available empirical evidence is inconclusive (see
a review in Section three), which makes generalization of the research findings difficult. In fact,
generalization is only possible if the findings from different site-specific studies are pooled in order
to identify common observable patterns [35]. While much of the policy toward land tenure has been
theory driven, a more site-specific approach to soil conservation policy is needed to understand the
livelihood strategies of local people in developing countries in terms of rationale and constraints [36,37].
Vietnam is one of the countries that have undergone dramatic economic growth over the
last several decades. The Gross Domestic Product grew by 7.3% per year during 1995–2005 [38].
The country had a centrally-planned economy in which all land was nationalized in the past.
The performance of the economy in general and that of the agricultural sector in particular were
very poor at that time. Poverty was widespread, and forest and land resources were seriously
degraded [39,40]. Facing these challenges in the late 1980s, Vietnam started its renovation policy
package known as “Doi Moi” with the primary aim of promoting economic growth. The starting point
of this structural adjustment policy was the privatization of the main productive asset, in this case
farm land, and then to legalize its free exchange by providing land titles. Other renovations included
the elimination of production and consumption subsidies, deregulation of agricultural input–output
markets, and liberalization of trade [41]. As a consequence, Vietnam has benefited from rapid economic
growth. From a situation of chronic rice shortage in the 1980s, it has transformed itself into one of the
largest rice exporters in the world [42].
Although various studies have investigated the impacts of this land reform in
Vietnam [33,39,41,43,44], only few of them deal with soil conservation at the household level [45].
This is partly due to the lack of reliable household data. Vietnam can be seen as a prevailing case
of anthropogenic land degradation. Though agriculture remains the most important sector of the
Vietnamese economy in terms of employment share, agricultural land is, on average, only about
0.11 hectares (ha) per capita. Land degradation is one of the most striking problems for the country.
At least 64,000 km2 of land (19% of the national land area) have experienced persistent declines in
biomass productivity over the last 25 years [40]. As agricultural land is scarce, one of the major
concerns for the national policy makers is how to use the land in a more sustainable manner, especially
in the mountainous regions, where land degradation and soil erosion are serious problems [46].
Our paper thus aims to examine the impacts of improved tenure security via land reform on manure
use of farm households in a mountainous area of Vietnam, the Northern Uplands. Manure use adds
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organic matter and nutrients such as nitrogen to the soil and thus benefits both crop productivity
and soil fertility. We hypothesize that improved land tenure security promotes manure use by farm
households in the study area. As the land reform is not yet completed in Vietnam, and land tenure
insecurity is still a problem in many regions of developing countries, the study would provide relevant
information that might be useful for the formulation of different soil conservation policies and soil
management practices. Since land degradation is a complex problem [47,48], and successful soil
conservation requires the integration of different methods from different scientific disciplines [3,47],
our findings are supposed to contribute, together with the efforts from other disciplines, to the
identification of more comprehensible and holistic solutions.
2. Land Tenure in Vietnam before and after the Renovation
2.1. Land Tenure before the Renovation
Vietnam had been invaded several times in the past. The country had been colonized over many
years by different Chinese dynasties. This was followed by the French invasion until 1954. Vietnam
was then separated into two parts, the North and the South, with two different administrations:
a Communist state backed by the former Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the North, and
a United States-supported state in the South. The country was reunified in 1975. As land is one of
the most important assets for the majority of the Vietnamese, land policy has been the focal concern
in every historical period and has been changed continually. This section highlights the land policy
before the renovation as a basis for the land reform that is empirically examined in this study.
2.1.1. Land Tenure in the Pre-French Colonial Period
In the pre-French colonial period, the social structure in lowland Vietnam was relatively
homogenous, and the systems of land tenure were similar across the lowland regions [49].
The village-level organization was a complex mixture of patriarchy and kinship with Confucian
elements dominating the allocation of communal lands [50]. Thus, rather than being strictly feudal,
the system of political control in this period was characterized by some signs of “private” ownership
and a centralized monarchy [51]. The centralized monarchy, with the King as its symbol, proclaimed
itself as the supreme owner of all land. Land could be awarded by the King to his royal officials.
The village exerted direct control over the village land. Each village community directly managed and
exploited the land within its confines [49]. According to the customary land law at that time, public
village land was distributed to households for cultivation based on the number of male household
laborers and could be redistributed after a period of three to five years so as to take into account the
population change [52]. The overlapping land ownership and the dual management and exploitation
of public land within each village created many loopholes to convert public land into private land [50].
The privatization of the public land had made it to be smaller and smaller over the years. At the
beginning of the 20th century, the ruling dynasty took back part of the land areas which had been
allocated to high officials to return to villages [49,53].
2.1.2. Land Tenure in the French Colonial Period
The French expansion of its colonies into Vietnam from 1859 onwards heralded a shift in the
operation and governance of Vietnam, in its institutions and land management in particular [49].
Essentially, colonialism led to the formal institutionalization of capitalism for the first time in
Vietnam [50]. This became manifest in the creation of private landlord classes who controlled land
and rented it to landless peasants [52]. During this period, generous land grants to French settlers and
to Vietnamese bureaucrats resulted in an extremely skewed land distribution and in the creation of
a large group of tenant farmers and landless laborers. For the whole country, 52% of the land was
owned by only 3% of the indigenous population, and more than 60% of farmers across the country
were landless in the 1940s [43,54]. A substantial amount of land fell into the hands of the French.
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From 1859 (the beginning of French invasion) to 1912, the French colonial rulers seized 469,724 ha of
land [55]. Ten years later, this figure rose to 775,700 ha [54,56]. Thus, by the end of the 1930s, the total
amount of land owned by the French was over 1.2 million ha, accounting for one fourth of the total
cultivated area in Vietnam at that time [52,54].
2.1.3. Land Tenure in the Separation Period
After the victory over the French in 1954, Vietnam was separated into two parts, the North and
the South, and various land reforms were conducted in both parts. In the North, a thorough program
of land expropriation and redistribution was carried out between 1953 and 1957. Land was confiscated
from the landlords and then transferred to the peasants. By the end of this period, 810,000 ha (37%) of
the cultivable land in the North were distributed to 2.1 million households, an average of 0.4 ha per
household [51,54]. However, the policy was reversed and land began to be collectivized in the late
1950s [43,54]. The plots of land that peasants had received were soon taken away through the process
of collectivization [57,58]. Each member of agricultural cooperatives was assigned a specific number
of points for the quantity of work done each day. Payment at the end of the season was based on the
number of points accumulated. Since differences in quality of works were costly to monitor and led to
conflicts among team members, the point system was quickly degenerated into a fixed point system
for the number of hours worked. With the fixed point system, individual members had an incentive to
shirk from their assigned responsibilities; hence; productivity declined. Collectivization of agricultural
production in the North suffered from the fate of similar systems in other socialist countries [54].
In the South, the distribution of the landholdings at that time was even more skewed compared to
that in the North since it was less populated. Land was held by only a small number of landlords and
the majority of the population was tenants. By 1955, about 40% of rice land areas in the South were
held by some 2500 individuals, or 0.25% of the rural population [54,57]. The government attempted to
alter the basic land ownership pattern by limiting the ownership of rice land to a maximum of 100 ha
per owner, and requiring that owners who hold more than this sell the excess to the government,
which was then redistributed to tenants. As a result, about 1.3 million ha of agricultural land were
reallocated to over 1 million farmers, an average of 1.3 ha per farmer by the end of 1974 [43,54,59].
In April 1975, the country was reunified with the victory of the Northern government. The system
was then changed towards the collectivization policy as it had existed in the North, even though not
completely the same.
A comparison of per capita rice output from 1942 to 1986 reveals the depressed state of rice
production in Vietnam. During this 45 year period, per capita rice output had been stagnant at
260–280 kilograms [60]. Agricultural yields were extremely low; for example, rice yield was only
2.8 tons per ha during 1984–1986 [54,60], and even as late as 1985, Vietnam was a net importer of rice,
implying an urgent need for the renovation.
2.2. Land Reform in the Renovation Context
In 1981, the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam promulgated Directive 100, or in short,
“Contract 100”, aimed at improving agricultural productivity through increased individual incentives.
This was done by assigning land use contracts to individual farmers. Farmers were allowed to keep
the total surplus they produced over the contracted output that had to be paid to the government,
although land and production materials were still controlled by the cooperatives. Land use contracts
were signed on an annual basis. The farmers were free to add more inputs and allocate their own time
and labor to achieve higher yields. Conceptually, the introduction of the contract system is equivalent
to a shift from a fixed wage (of the collective system) to a fixed rent system. This shift led to an annual
increase in rice output of 2.8% during 1982–1987 [54]. Directive 100 of the ruling party was formalized
with the promulgation of a new land law in 1987 (Land Law 1987). However, land use rights were
not transferable and land could not be used as collateral for loans. Agricultural land and production
materials remained under control of agricultural cooperatives. In the absence of land titles, farmers
continued to feel insecure [43].
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In 1988, the Politburo of the Communist Party passed Resolution 10, which recognized the
household as an independent economic unit and issued instructions for the allocation of land to
households on a more permanent basis. The de-collectivization process was started. This resolution
was formalized by a new land law in 1993 (Land Law 1993), which granted additional five rights to
the households: rights to transfer, exchange, inherit, rent and mortgage, and allowed the allocation of
land to organizations, individuals and households for stable use within the defined time of 20 years
for annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops and forestry. The tenure can be renewed on expiry if
land users wish to do so and if they have used the land properly in accordance with the regulations.
Land use certificates (internationally known as land titles) are provided for privatized land. However,
land ceilings that every household can be allocated were introduced for annual crops of two ha in the
North and three ha in the South, and ten ha for perennial crop land [61]. Further revisions of Land Law
1993 removed land ceilings and encouraged the establishment of large farms. Recent agricultural land
tenure policies and some related economic and environmental issues can be summarized in Figure 1.
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Similarly to previous land reforms, Land Law 1993 was unevenly implemented throughout the
country. A phenomenon likely to slow down the process was the number of disputes that can emerge
in villages. The way the allocation was made, the existence of pre-existing property rights, the capacity
of local staff of the competent authorities are several determinants that can cause o e region to achieve
faster registration t an anot er [43,61]. As Land Law 1993 is a cornerstone in liberalizing agricultural
production in Vietnam by privatizing land, its impacts on manure use by farm households are thus
examined in our study. The essence of Land Law 1993 is the privatization of farm land to individual
households, which mad agricultura producti in Vietnam change fundamentally from a collective
to an individual basis.
3. Land Tenure S cu ty and Soil Conse vation
3.1. Theoretical Linkage and Empirical Evidence
Property righ s und rlie the performanc and income distribution in all economies [36,62].
By defining the parameters for the use of scarce resources and assigning the associated rewards and
costs, the prevailing system of property rights establishes incentives and time horizons for investment,
production, and exchange. Since property rights define the behavioral norms for the assignment
and use of resources, it is possible to predict how differences in property rights affect economic
activities [63]. That linkage is critical for research in economic history to understand variations in
growth and welfare across societies and time. Bromley [36] describes property rights as a social relation
amongst individuals within a society: if an object is available in insufficient quantity to meet the
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objectives of all individuals within a society, then discrimination is necessary to determine the extent
to which each individual’s objective will be satisfied [64]. As they define the costs and rewards of
decision making, property rights establish the parameters under which decisions are made regarding
resource use [63].
There are different definitions of land tenure in the literature. For example, it is defined as a system
of rights and institutions that govern access to and use of land and other resources [24], or as a bundle
of use rights, control rights, and transfer rights [65]. The rights may be enforced by a government
whose officials explicitly grant such rights to land users. If so, such rights are de jure rights in that they
are given lawful recognition. Rights-holders who have de jure rights can presume that if their rights
were challenged in an administrative or judicial setting, their rights would most likely be sustained.
However, in some situations land users cooperate to define and enforce rights among themselves.
Such rights are de facto as long as they are not recognized by government authorities [62]. Land users
who have developed de facto rights act as if they have de jure rights by enforcing these rights among
themselves. In some setting de facto rights may eventually be given recognition in courts of law if
challenged, but until so recognized they are less secure than de jure rights [64,66–68].
Land tenure changes can occur due to either evolutionary changes or institutional reforms
(Figure 2). The evolution of individual land rights and a mechanism to enforce such rights in the
rural setting is closely related to increases in the population density and to advances in agricultural
technology [63]. As land becomes scarce, societies that have practiced shifting cultivation must adopt
fertility-restoring technologies to allow for continued use of the land. Since such technologies require
investments of both capital and effort, the cultivator must have an investment incentive. For the
cultivator, this incentive is given when the right to cultivate continuously and the ability to transfer
a given tract of land are secured not only by social customs, but also by an effective state-enforced
legal system [29]. Thus, population growth and agricultural progress are typically accompanied by
a mechanism to enforce land rights [29,66]. The initial land tenure system can also change with state
interventions by conducting land reforms. These two main root causes of land tenure changes are
not independent but interlinked, since changes in population, technology, and markets can also be
the reason for a state to intervene in its land tenure system [69]. Changes in land tenure systems in
turn lead to changes in resource use, productivity, and income. It is also worth putting land tenure
changes in the more general context of economic structural change. For example, activation of land
markets, either by rentals or by sales, can lead to changes in productivity and the occurrence of land
accumulation by some households and the exit of agricultural production by others. Thus, changes
in land tenure systems can lead to changes in the economic structure in terms of either income or
redistribution of resources, such as land and labor.
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Although the basic economic logic between land tenure and land use is clear, the empirical
evidence is inconclusive. The impacts of increased land tenure security have been investigated
for years (see reviews by Robinson et al. [70]; Sjaastad et al. [71]; Kabubo-Mariara [72], Maxwell
and Wiebe [24]), which can be classified into (i) impacts on access to credit, farm investment,
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and yield [26,73]; (ii) impacts on land distribution and transfer [33,74]; (iii) impacts on resource
conservation [2,15,70,75,76]; and (iv) impacts on food security [23]. However, the major focus has
been on investment and productivity [74]. In Honduras, Lopez, [77] concludes that land titles do not
affect land productivity. This finding is consistent with Montaner-Larson, [67], who also concludes
that giving titles to small coffee farms on state-owned land in Honduras does not affect credit access,
technical efficiency, or input use. Feder et al. [29] find that tenure security is important for access to
formal credit and land investment in Thailand, although such a relationship does not hold in the region
with a well-established informal credit market. Carter et al. [78] find no significant relationship between
land titles and output, income, and profit in Kenya. Besley, [68] finds a positive linkage between
tenure security and productivity in Ghana, and argues that tenure security might be endogenous
with respect to investments. Hayes et al. [79] show that tenure security has a significant positive
effect on long-term investment, which has a positive impact on yield in Gambia. Interestingly, as
stated by Deininger and Jin (2008), some observers of land reform programs that give land as a grant
to beneficiaries suggest that productivity could be lower. The idea is that land reform beneficiaries
can include people who are inexperienced with farming, people who are more interested in holding
land for speculation than farming, and people who for whatever reason are unlikely to invest in
farming [33]. Kabubo-Mariara, [72] finds a positive correlation between land tenure security and land
conservation in Kenya. Robinson et al. [70] find evidence that land tenure security is associated with
less deforestation.
3.2. Empirical Evidence in Vietnam
Applying this theoretical linkage to Vietnam, it is recognized that a sharp increase in population
after years of war and the stagnation in cooperative agricultural production forced the government
of Vietnam to conduct the land reform. In this regard, the reform was indeed made by the state and
driven by social pressure. Therefore, the conceptual framework of the study is developed based on
Feder et al. [29] and Nguyen et al. [39] (Figure 3). The most important features of the land reform in
Vietnam are: (i) farmers now have ownership of their land, which is enforced and protected by a legal
mechanism; and (ii) land titles are provided for land exchange and used as collateral for credits. It is
often theorized that insecure land rights cause market imperfection and increase the risks associated
with farming through the threat of dispossession, leading to a lower level of input use and decreased
productivity [77,79,80].
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In Vietnam, Vo and Pingali [54] examine the impact of the movement from the collective to the
contract system introduced for rice production in 1981; they show that collectivization accounts for
a total productivity decline of 48%. However, due to the lack of data on input use, they are unable
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to separate the impact of decentralization of input supplies and the incentive that farmers had when
changing from the collective to the contract system. Regarding the land reform, Do and Iyer [43] find
that better land rights lead to a significant increase in area devoted to multi-year crops, in irrigation
investment, and in labor devoted to non-farm activities. As the data on land reform for individual
households were not available, the authors use the land registration rate of each province as a proxy
for land tenure security. The land registration rate, in this case, does not fully reflect the changes
in land tenure at the farm level brought by Land Law 1993. Deininger and Jin [33] use the dataset
of Do and Iyer [43] to identify factors affecting the development of land markets and to assess the
extent to which land transfers enhance productive efficiency. They find that both rental and sales
markets have rapidly increased, enhanced by the possession of long-term use rights and off-farm
employment. However, they face the same problem of lacking data on land reform at the farm level.
Ravallion and van de Walle [41] examine the impacts of land reform on access to credit, on land
market operation, and on the level of landlessness. However, similar to the previously mentioned
studies, they cannot separate the effects of land privatization and land titling. Nguyen [26] investigates
the impacts of land privatization and land titling on chemical fertilizer use and land productivity
and find a positive relationship, but these studies do not investigate such impacts on manure use.
Saint-Macary et al. [45] find that the possession of a formal land title positively influences the adoption
of agroforestry practices. Nguyen et al. [81] show that land titling motivates farmers to invest more in
afforestation in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam.
As described by Do and Iyer [43] and Ravallion and van de Walle [41], the implementation of
the land reform is not homogenous in the whole country. This means some regional characteristics
might not have been taken into account in the previous studies. In addition, Saint-Macary et al. [45]
and Nguyen [26] state that the implementation of land privatization and land titling is very lengthy
and costly. In principle, land must be privatized first and then a title is provided. This process implies
considerable administrative costs for measuring land, registering and issuing land titles. The lack
of qualified personnel is another reason for the slowness of the process, especially in the Northern
Uplands. In this regard, the present paper contributes to the current research in the following ways:
(i) it is the first effort to examine the impacts of land reform on manure use by farm households;
(ii) it is able to separate the effects of land privatization and land titling; and (iii) by focusing on
the Northern Uplands, the study takes into account the specific characteristics of land reform in this
particular region.
4. Study Design
4.1. Study Area and Data Collection
The area of the Northern Uplands is approximately 102,000 km2, a little less than one-third of the
area of the country. It borders with China to the North, Laos to the West and South, and is bisected
diagonally by the Red River. Much of the region consists of hills and mountains with elevations
between 500 m and 1000 m above sea level [82]. Within the whole region, the mountains alone
comprise 89,000 square kilometers (82% of the area). Its ethnic diversity is represented by 31 of 54
officially recognized ethnic groups [26]. Although Vietnam has become a big rice exporter, the region
still faces food insecurity problems [39]. In terms of land use, 47% is classified as “unused land” [11].
This is the source of land that farmers claimed for cultivation [83]. Thus, at the time of the land reform,
in addition to the land areas that had been granted by Resolution 10, farmers in the Northern Uplands
had also free claimed landholdings. Therefore, there was a need for land legalization. This is the
process of legalizing free claimed landholdings as privatized land. Finally, land titles were provided
for privatized land. These factors made land reform in the region more complicated in comparison
with other regions of the country [61].
In 1992–1993 and 1997–1998, the government of Vietnam conducted two Vietnam Living Standard
Surveys (VLSS) [61]. The aim of these surveys was to provide a systematic collection of data reflecting
the actual material and living standards from those households which are selected for the survey
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sample and to provide necessary information to meet the needs for analysis of socio-economic policies.
The selection of the sample followed a method of stratified random sampling (see SPC [84] and GSO [85]
for detailed descriptions of these surveys). The household questionnaire consists of about 700 questions
on living conditions, which are grouped into 15 sections: Household roster, education, health,
employment, migration, housing, fertility, agricultural production, non-farm economic activities,
food expenditure and consumption, non-food expenditure, durable goods, other income, savings
and credit, and anthropometric measures. The prices of all goods and services are included in the
price questionnaire.
As our aim is to examine the changes in manure use by farm households, the panel data of the
VLSS of 1993 and 1998 were combined with further data collection in our primary survey in 2006.
Five provinces in the Northern Uplands were selected for this primary survey, namely Hoa Binh,
Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang, Yen Bai, and Son La (see Figure 4). There were 32 farm households in each
of these provinces that had been interviewed in the two VLSS. These households were re-interviewed
in 2006. The household questionnaire and price questionnaire were shortened to cover only the
variables of interest (see the next subsection). With regard to the land reform, based on the yearly
records and statistics at local institutions, the information on privatized land share and land title of
farm households was collected. All data were then cross-checked for plausibility and consistency, and
corrected if needed with the heads of the surveyed households.
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Figure 4. The Northern Uplands and provinces in which the surveys were done.
Although the numbe of households identified at the beginning of the p imary survey was 160
(32 in each province for five provinces), only 133 households were found and agreed to tak part in
the primary survey. Therefore, a panel dataset for 133 farms in 1993, 1998, and 2006 was established.
Panel data provide information on individual behavior, both across time and across individuals, and
can enrich empirical analysis in ways that might not be possible with cross-section or time-series
data, as panel data provide more information, less collinearity among variables, and more degrees of
freedom [86].
4.2. Econometric Specification
In the Northern Uplands, farmers make manure by mixing animal dung with rice straw. It is
normally stored in their home gardens until the planting season when it is transported to agricultural
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fields. The dependent variable in our econometric model is the quantity of manure use per ha of
each household. The independent variables, theoretically, represent household’s characteristics, farm
endowments, prices of farm inputs and outputs, and land tenure security [64,75]. The relationship can
be conceptualized as follows.
Mit “ f pHit, Lit, Iit, Oit, Sitq (1)
where M is the quantity of manure use per ha (kg/ha), H is the household’s characteristics, L is the land
endowment, I is the input price, O is the output price, and S is the land tenure security. The subscripts
i and t denote household i in year t.
The household’s characteristics include human and financial factors. Human factors are
represented by the dependency ratio (dep), which is calculated by dividing the number of dependents
(under 16 and over 60 years old) by the number of laborers (from 16 to 60 years old), age (age),
education level (educ), ethnicity (ethnic), and gender (gender) of the household head. The financial
factors include the value of productive durable assets (hhasset), annual non-farm income (nfin), and
a dummy if non-farm income is permanent (nfper). These financial factors represent the financial
capability of the households in purchasing farm inputs. Non-farm income is important in crop
production. As a result of economic progress in the country, it is expected that the income from
non-farm sectors could influence the level of input use. Non-farm activities compete with farming for
labor; however, they can increase the purchasing power of the household for other farm inputs such
as chemical fertilizers. In this sense, crop production may be more capital and less labor intensive.
However, from field observation, we recognize that a household with permanent non-farm income
does not invest much in crop production because the household is more food secure and is more
interested in investing in other businesses. Some members of the household are permanent workers,
teachers, or staff of local institutions. They receive a monthly wage. Thus, a dummy is used to take
this into account.
Farm endowments include the farm land area (agland) of the household and the number of cattle
and pigs that can provide manure (cattle and pigs are kept in stables). For input prices, as manure is
not bought or sold by farmers, we use the prices of chemical fertilizer because this is the input that
farmers have to buy and that takes the highest share of farming expenditure (50%, [26]). With respect
to the output side, we use the price of rice as a proxy, as rice is the staple food in the region. Since
the price data refer to three different years, 1993, 1998, and 2006, the input price index (inpindex) and
output price index (outindex) are calculated with 1993 as the base year.
For land tenure security, claimed land must be first legalized by competent authorities as privatized
land, and then titled. Thus, a household may cultivate some tracts of land that are not yet legalized.
Therefore, two variables, privatized land share (plshare) and land title dummy (title), are used. The
privatized land share is the share of privatized agricultural land within the total agricultural land of the
farm. The land title dummy indicates if the title of the privatized land is handed over to the farmer. By
using these two land reform variables, it is possible to quantify the separate effects of land privatization
and land titling. As our data are from three years in five different provinces, two temporal dummies are
used for 1998 and 2006, and four spatial dummies are used to take into account the temporal and spatial
heterogeneity that are not captured by the above independent variables. All continuous variables are in
logarithm (ln) form. Monetary values of non-farm income and household assets are converted to 1994
real values. Therefore, Equation (1) can be further specified as follows.
lnmanureit “ α `β1lndepit `β2lneducit `β3lnageit `β4ethnicit `β5genderit
`β6lnaglandit `β7lnhhassetit `β8lnnfinit `β9nfperit
`β10plshareit `β11titleit `β12inpindexit `β13outindexit
`β14year1998 `β15year2006 `β16pro2 `β17pro3 `β18pro4
`β19pro5 `β20lncattleit `9it
(2)
A number of technical challenges in the econometric specification were addressed: (i) the
endogeneity of land tenure: the main source of land tenure endogeneity is household’s characteristics
and land quality. As previously described, the study area is mountainous with poor and rocky soil.
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Household’s characteristics might thus be a more important source of land tenure endogeneity. At the
plot level in Vietnam, Markussen et al. [44] conclude that the land title is exogenous. However, it
is still plausible that land tenure is endogenous. Therefore, a Hausman specification test [87] was
separately performed for the variables plshare and title. The result showed that there are no endogeneity
problems; (ii) potential multicollinearity problems between plshare and title and between nfin and nfper.
The correlation coefficient between plshare and title was 0.483 and between nfin and nfper was only 0.338,
which indicated that there are no multicollinearity problems between these variables; (iii) rich households
might have quicker land privatization and titling. This was rejected, as the correlation coefficient
between hhasset and plshare was 0.339 and that between hhasset and title was 0.443; (iv) the selection of
regression methods for panel data might be an issue. The fixed effect model might be a more appropriate
specification than the random effect model for dealing with unobserved time-invariant factors that
might be correlated with both land tenure and input demand or productivity. Therefore, a Hausman
specification test was conducted and an insignificant P-value indicated a similar estimation between the
two models; (v) the last challenge was the high number of exogenous variables. The examination of the
multicollinearity among these exogenous variables showed that the values of the variance inflation factor
of input and output price indices were more than 10. This implies a possible multicollinearity issue for
these two variables with other independent variables. Thus, in the empirical analysis, three regression
models were examined: (i) full model that includes all these independent variables; (ii) price-excluded
model that excludes input and output price indices; and (iii) significant factor model that includes only
statistically significant variables and spatial and temporal dummies derived from the full model. It also
excludes input and output price indices as in the price-excluded model. The estimated coefficients from
these three different models can provide a range of the estimated effects of these factors on the quantity
per ha of manure used by farm households.
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. Main Characteristics of Farm Households
The basic characteristics of farm households, as presented in Table 1, show that the household size
decreases from 1993 to 2006, but the number of household laborers increases during the same period.
There are a number of reasons: (i) the economic growth over years has accelerated the consciousness
on reproductive issues and thus reduced the household size; and (ii) some members of the household
were still young during the first interview and reached working age in the later interview; and some
old members died during the same period. This reduced the dependency ratio. Most household heads
are middle-aged. The age has increased from 1993 to 2006. This is because the same households were
interviewed. It is noted that in some households, the household head changes over time when one of
the sons takes over that role from his father/mother.
Table 1. Main characteristics of farm households.
Characteristic 1993 (1) 1998 (2) 2006 (3) Test
HH size
5.16 ** 2 *** 3 5.14 ** 1 4.72 *** 1 12.41 *** a
(1.84) (1.53) (1.36)
HH labor
2.35 *** 2 *** 3 2.65 *** 1 *** 3 2.92 *** 1 *** 2 28.95 *** b
(0.89) (0.99) (1.05)
Dependency ratio 1.31 **
2 *** 3 1.08 **1 *** 3 0.77 *** 1 *** 2 41.53 *** b
(0.80) (0.65) (0.70)
Age (years) 40.7 **
2 *** 3 43.4 ** 1 *** 3 49.36 *** 1 *** 2 39.47 *** b
(14.27) (13.09) (11.74)
Education (years) 5.92 6.12 6.19 0.08
a
(2.42) (2.42) (2.37)
Share of male heads (%)
90 89 91 0.17 c
(29.81) (30.81) (28.76)
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Table 1. Cont.
Characteristic 1993 (1) 1998 (2) 2006 (3) Test
Share of minority heads (%) 70 70 70 0.00
c
(46.03) (46.03) (46.03)
Asset value (million VND) 2.64 ***
2 *** 3 4.32 *** 1 *** 3 6.72 *** 1 *** 2 180.31 *** b
(0.86) (1.98) (3.28)
Real non-farm income (million VND) 0.63 ***
2 *** 3 1.64 *** 1 *** 3 2.94 *** 1 *** 2 93.80 *** b
(0.81) (1.53) (3.53)
Share of HHs with permanent non-farm income (%) 8.27 6.02 *
3 12.78 * 2 3.85 c
(27.65) (23.87) (33.52)
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, standard deviations in parentheses, a ANOVA test,
b nonparametric k-sample test (Kruskal-Wallis test), c χ2 test; the superscripts in columns 2, 3, 4 indicate the
difference of each respective year to the other years, e.g., the household size in 1993 is significantly different
from that in 1998 at 5% significance level according to the ANOVA test; column 5 includes the tests for the
difference of all years and shows if at least two years are significantly different from each other.
The education level, in general, is low in the study area. This is because in this remote and
mountainous region, low living standards, together with limited access to education, constrain
schooling. In general, only primary schools (from class 1 to class 5) are available in villages.
The unchanged education level over the years is also due to the fact that all household heads are adults.
They have little chance for further education after becoming heads of the households. The change
of education level, if it happens, is due to the transfer of the role of the household head from the
father/mother to the son, as mentioned above. Regarding gender, most households are male-headed.
This is the case in Vietnam in general and in the study area in particular. Traditionally, families are
male-headed in Vietnam. Most household heads belong to minority ethnic groups because the study
area is the home of different minority ethnic groups. Household non-farm income has increased from
1993 to 1998. This is due to the economic progress that has created wage opportunities for household
members. The trend of permanent non-farm income is also similar. The share of the number of
households with permanent non-farm income increases from 8% in 1993 to 13% in 2006.
5.2. Farm Land Endowment and Land Reform
The average farm land endowment of a household, as presented in Table 2, shows that the farm
land per household decreased from 1993 to 2006; at the same time, the privatized land area increased
and the claimed land area decreased. The reduction in farm land per household can be explained
by the following: (i) farm land was more abundant in 1993 and was claimed for cultivation; (ii) land
privatization was conducted on an egalitarian basis; (iii) land was readjusted among households
during the legalization process of claimed land. During this process, part of the claimed land area of
large landholders was redistributed to small landholders or newly established households; and (iv)
land was divided to heirs.
Table 2. Average farm land endowment of farm households.
Characteristic 1993 (1) 1998 (2) 2006 (3) Test
Privatized farm land (ha) 0.28 *
2 *** 3 0.34 * 1 *** 3 0.40 *** 1 *** 2 24.190 ***
(0.17) (0.22) (0.22)
Claimed farm land (ha) 0.41 ***
2 *** 3 0.29 *** 1 *** 3 0.15 *** 1 *** 2 55.878 ***
(0.84) (0.61) (0.18)
Total farm land (ha)
0.69 0.63 0.55 1.939
(0.91) (0.71) (0.34)
Farm land per capita (ha) 0.13 0.12 0.12 2.379
(0.12) (0.14) (0.08)
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, standard deviations in parentheses, nonparametric
k-sample test (Kruskal-Wallis test); the superscripts in columns 2, 3, 4 indicate the difference of each respective
year to the other years, e.g., the household size in 1993 is significantly different from that in 1998 at the 5%
significance level according to the Wilcoxon rank sum test; column 5 includes the tests for the difference of all
years and shows if at least two years are significantly different from each other.
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Table 3 summarizes the progress of land privatization and land titling in the study area. It is
noted that farm land had been granted to the households before 1993 in accordance with Resolution 10
(see Section 2). Thus, all sampled households had farm land in 1993. However, none of them had land
titles as land titling was only conducted after Land Law 1993. The figures in Table 3 also imply that
(i) even with privatized farm land, the land title might not be available due to the time-consuming land
titling process. This limits the bundle of land rights to be fully realized; and (ii) in 2006, there is still
a portion of farm land that has not been legalized, indicating that the land reform is not yet completed.
Table 3. Progress of land privatization and land titling.
1993 1998 2006
Share of HHs with privatized farm land (%) 100 100 100
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of HHs with title for privatized farm land (%) 0.00 69.92 90.23
(0.00) (46.03) (29.81)
Share of privatized land of a HH (%) 51.40 67.19 79.12
(18.54) (23.18) (18.50)
Share of titled land of a HH (%)
0.00 57.83 78.64
(0.00) (32.70) (20.84)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
5.3. Cattle, Manure Use, Input, and Output Price Indices
The average number of cattle and pigs, manure use, and input and output price indices are
presented in Table 4. Cattle and pigs are an indispensable part of the farming systems in the study
area [83]. As cattle are expensive, not every household has cattle. Table 4 also shows that the share of
households who have cattle and the number of cattle per household is rather low and remains nearly
constant over time. This was mainly due to three main constraints farmers faced after renovation:
(i) inadequacy of initial investment as purchasing cattle requires a large amount of money; (ii) lack
of technical know-how about the treatment of diseases; and (iii) limited grazing area due to the
privatization of forest land. In contrast, the number of pigs has increased significantly. Before
renovation, pigs had been raised only for home consumption due to limited access to the markets
(poor infrastructure and strong control of the government), and low demand due to low income levels.
After renovation, the markets for pigs have quickly developed.
Table 4. Livestock and manure use by farm households and price changes.
1993 (1) 1998 (2) 2006 (3) Test
Share of HHs having cattle (%) 71.43 66.92 72.93
(45.35) (47.23) (44.60)
No. of cattle per HH 1.74 1.39 1.47 2.069
(2.20) (1.57) (1.72)
Share of HHs having pigs (%) 81.20 94.74 88.72
(39.22) (22.41) (31.75)
No. of pigs per HH 1.63 ***
2 *** 3 3.41 *** 1 ** 3 4.62 *** 1 ** 2 77.308 ***
(1.52) (2.60) (3.98)
Manure use (ton/ha) 1.31 ***
2 *** 3 3.27 *** 1 *** 3 6.17 *** 1 *** 2 191.685 ***
(1.79) (2.28) (8.65)
Input price index 1.00 1.90 2.94
(0.00) (0.28) (0.39)
Output price index 1.00 1.66 2.49
(0.00) (0.12) (0.08)
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, standard deviations in parentheses, nonparametric
k-sample test (Kruskal-Wallis test); the superscripts in columns 2, 3, 4 indicate the difference of each respective
year to the other years, e.g., the household size in 1993 is significantly different from that in 1998 at the 5%
significance level, according to the Wilcoxon rank sum test; column 5 includes the tests for the difference of all
years and shows if at least two years are significantly different from each other.
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5.4. Determinants of Manure Use
The results of the full, price-excluded and significant factor models are presented in Table 5.
The Wald-chi2 values show that the presented models are all statistically significant and can be used to
explain the variations in manure use by farmers. In all three models, the coefficients of the variables
representing land reform, privatized land share, and land title dummy are statistically significant and
positive. The results confirm that the land reform has positive effects on the application of manure in
crop production by farmers. This finding is consistent with that of Feder et al. [29], Hayes et al. [79],
and Waithaka et al. [29]. However, the levels of the influence are different. If privatized land share of
a household increases by one percent, the quantity of manure use per ha would increase only slightly;
but if a farmer has his or her land title, he or she would use 18% to 22% more manure per ha. Thus, the
effect of land title is much higher than that of the privatized land share in the study area. This indicates
that having the land title makes farmers more secure than being granted land.
Table 5. Determinants of manure use by farm households.
Random-Effects GLS Dependent
Variable: Manure Quantity/ha (ln) Full Model Price-Excluded Model Significant-Factor Model
No. of cattle and pigs (ln) 0.045 *** (0.017) 0.045 *** (0.017) 0.043 *** (0.016)
Dependency ratio (ln) ´0.008 (0.016) ´0.011 (0.016)
Education (ln) 0.169 *** (0.031) 0.172 *** (0.031) 0.171 *** (0.026)
Age (ln) ´0.079 (0.083) ´0.069 (0.083)
Ethnicity (Kinh = 1) 0.263 *** (0.052) 0.256 *** (0.052) 0.261 *** (0.050)
Gender (male = 1) ´0.084 (0.076) ´0.099 (0.076)
Farm land (ln) ´0.855 *** (0.042) ´0.861 *** (0.042) ´0.871 *** (0.041)
Asset value (ln) ´0.001 (0.057) 0.002 (0.057)
Non-farm income (ln) ´0.042 *** (0.012) ´0.044 *** (0.012) ´0.046 *** (0.011)
Permanent non-farm income (yes = 1) -0.052 (0.079) ´0.040 (0.078)
Privatized land share 0.003 ** (0.001) 0.003 ** (0.001) 0.003 *** (0.001)
Land title (yes = 1) 0.200 *** (0.073) 0.168 ** (0.072) 0.174 ** (0.070)
Input price index 0.186 (0.114)
Output price index 0.536 * (0.286)
Year 1998 dummy (yes = 1) 0.406 * (0.236) 0.944 *** (0.072) 0.938 *** (0.071)
Year 2006 dummy (yes = 1) 0.336 (0.502) 1.511 *** (0.090) 1.499 *** (0.085)
Province 2 dummy (yes = 1) ´0.090 (0.074) ´0.148 ** (0.070) ´0.159 ** (0.068)
Province 3 dummy (yes = 1) ´0.061 (0.073) ´0.067 (0.073) ´0.073 (0.072)
Province 4 dummy (yes = 1) 0.008 (0.082) ´0.019 (0.080) ´0.021 (0.078)
Province 5 dummy (yes = 1) ´0.058 (0.094) 0.009 (0.083) 0.014 (0.079)
Constant ´1.727 *** (0.464) ´1.054 *** (0.360) ´1.414 *** (0.103)
Wald-chi2 2267 2238 2246
Prob. > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 within 0.85 0.85 0.85
R2 between 0.86 0.86 0.87
R2 overall 0.86 0.85 0.85
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses.
In addition, manure use is positively affected by the number of cattle and pigs of farm households.
This is logical since households use their own manure. Regarding ethnicity, the dominant ethnic group
(the Kinh) applies more manure than the minorities. Manure use has not been the custom of minority
ethnic groups in the past even though this has been slowly changing. In the past, ethnic minorities
mainly practiced slash and burn agriculture [82]. In general, Kinh farmers apply about 29% more
manure per ha than minority ethnic farmers. Education of the household heads contributes positively
and significantly to the use of manure. This might be because with a higher education level, farmers
better understand the benefits of manure application, including higher outputs and soil conservation.
In terms of the gender of the household heads, the evidence shows that there is no statistical difference
in manure use between male and female-headed households.
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The asset value of the households does not have a statistically significant effect on manure use
because farmers do not purchase manure. Non-farm income has a negative and significant effect.
This may be due to labor division between livestock rearing and non-farm activities. When household
members are busy with non-farm jobs, they have less time for rearing livestock and transporting
manure from homesteads to their fields. The evidence also shows that there is no statistically significant
linkage between permanent non-farm jobs and manure use. However, agricultural land area has
a statistically significant and negative effect. This is understandable since manure comes from home
cattle and pigs. Therefore, a small landholding is more manure intensive.
Some spatial and temporal dummies have a significant effect. This indicates that there might
be other variables that are omitted from the models. For example, the differences in terms of
physical and climatic conditions as well as other socio-economic factors between provinces. This is
one of the limitations of our econometric models. In addition, evidence from other countries (see
Nguyen et al. [88]) shows that land privatization can lead to agricultural intensification, in which the
overuse of chemical fertilizers and manure has intensified soil and water pollution. Thus, our results
should be interpreted with care. Moreover, the fact that land degradation is still persistent in the study
area is an indicator that calls for studies from other disciplines to provide a base of more holistic and
comprehensible understanding of the causes of land degradation. For example, studies which measure
the organic contents of soils over a long-term period (see Arizpe et al. [47]) are needed. The integration
of different research methods from all relevant disciplines is increasingly recognized as essentially
needed because there is a nexus between land use, water, food, and energy [48,89,90].
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Increased land tenure security is theoretically expected to contribute to improved land
productivity and soil conservation. However, empirical evidence differs from case to case. This study
examines the impact of land privatization and land titling based on a recent land reform in Vietnam.
A panel dataset of 133 farm households is used in econometric regression models to determine the
factors affecting manure use by farm households in the Northern Uplands. The results of the analysis
confirm that increased land tenure security is associated with a higher level of manure use, but
land titling has a higher level of impact than land privatization. In addition, manure use by farm
households is also significantly affected by the number of cattle and pigs, farm land size, non-farm
income, education, and ethnicity of household heads.
These findings lead to a number of policy recommendations. First, the implementation of the
land reform should be sped up, as secure land titles are decisive in improving land productivity and
soil conservation; second, as the effect of non-farm income is negative, promoting economic growth in
non-farm sectors would facilitate economic structural change and allow the establishment of larger
farms, which increase the scope for economies of scale; third, developing cattle and pig rearing could
also contribute to more manure use in agriculture as its impact is positive; and fourth, enhancing
education in the study area is also beneficial to agriculture in particular and to the whole economy
in general. This would include the provision of short-term training courses or extension services for
ethnic minorities next to schooling to understand the benefits of manure use in farming.
Our research provides useful information from a purely economic point of view. However, this
leads to a number of limitations of our research. Firstly, our econometric models are not able to include
physical and climatic factors; for example, soil fertility as well as other socio-economic factors such
as locally-implemented farm subsidy programs. Secondly, agricultural intensification might lead to
negative consequences, such as the overuse of manure, which can pollute soil and water resources.
Thirdly, as soil conservation and land degradation are real-life complex issues, a comprehensive
understanding of the effects of different bio-physical and socio-economic factors, and of the nexus
between land use, water, energy, and food is required. We therefore call for integrated research efforts
that combine expertise from different disciplines with different methodological approaches.
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